This paper reviews the evolution of inward and outward FDI in Portugal over more than one century. This long term perspective provides an overview of the Portuguese economy in different phases of the world markets integration since the immediate pre-WWI period to the contemporary global economy, moving through the interwar period of neo-mercantilism and witnessing the slow revival of the world economy after WWII. The domestic economic and institutional experience has been at least so diverse as the global context: Portugal moved from a developing to an advanced economy, facing several economic and financial crises, different institutional and political environments more or less conducive to the integration in the world economy. Four issues are especially emphasized: the analysis of the so-called autarchic phase during the Estado Novo period; the role of FDI during the period of the most intense growth of the Portuguese economy (1960s and early 1970s); the entry strategies followed by foreign MNEs during a period of structural transformation in the volume of FDI inflows (1960s-1970s); the reasons for the surge in outward FDI after the late 1990s.
Introduction
A long-term perspective on the evolution of inward and outward foreign investment in Portugal over the twentieth century is largely absent from the literature. In a few cases the analysis has a greater chronological depth, namely in the studies by Matos (1973) . However, even in this case the author zooms in a specific period of time: the 1960s and early 1970s.
Other studies provide a long-term synthesis on foreign direct investment (e.g. Leite et al., 2001; Moreira and Dias 2008) , but they rely on a descriptive and very superficial approach with the exception of Taveira's doctoral dissertation (1984) . The chapters dedicated by the recent and in-depth História Económica de Portugal (Lains and Silva 2005, 3) to the internationalization of the Portuguese economy or to capital as a factor of production never address FDI, which is one important weakness of this work.
In the absence of studies with an historical matrix, the disciplinary tradition of economics clarifies some important issues on foreign investment. Firstly, foreign direct investment is approached as a component of the balance of payments (Matos 1973; Lopes 1996; Leite et al. 2001) . A second perspective seeks to understand the geographic location and microeconomic impact of foreign investment (Barbosa et al. 2004; Barbosa 2009; Barbosa and Eiriz 2009; Cardoso 2011; Crespo et al. 2009; Farinha and Mata 1996; Forte and Sarmento 2014;  the government decided to create a new agency; finally, in 2006, a new peak in FDI coincided with the end of the former agency.
The lack of stability and erratic policies, as well as the partisanship in the nominations for the boards of these different agencies, characterize this institutional framework. The case of Ireland, in contrast, is particularly revealing. An autonomous agency for attracting foreign investment has existed since 1949 (O'Gráda and O'Rourke 1995) . Notwithstanding the inevitable changes in policies and agency organization, the institutional continuity of the Investment Development Agency has been sustained (Ruane 2001; Tavares-Lehmann 2007) .
The evolution of inward and outward FDI
FDI in Portugal has a history prior to the twentieth century, particularly during the period of time of global economic growth after the mid-nineteenth century. However, the Portuguese economy seems to have benefited little from the global capital flows during the pre-WWI years (more optimistic view in Mata 2008) , despite the absence of aggregate statistical data comparable to the period after WWII. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, FDI clustered in natural resources (mining, agriculture, raw materials) and infrastructures (railways, utilities) (Jones 1996) . Portugal was not well endowed in natural resources and its poverty and backwardness prevented large capital inflows to transport infrastructure or utilities, explaining the low evidence of inward FDI. However, some foreign investment existed: electricity and gas (Lisbon and Porto); mining; cork and canned fish manufacturing; colonial ventures (diamonds, plantations).
The black hole in statistical data on inward FDI continues after WWI and until the WWII.
However, the scarce information points to very low levels. It is not difficult to imagine a more unfavourable situation regarding FDI inflows to Portugal. The aftermath of WWI was instability (Silva and Amaral 2011) . Only in the mid-1920s did the financial situation start to stabilize and in the late 1920s the authoritarian regime ended the fragile parliamentary regime.
However, this financial and political stabilization happened at a time when the Great Depression was dramatically decreasing global investment flows. The Second World War accentuated the international instability, even though Portugal, as a neutral country, became a shelter for thousands of refugees fleeing war and persecution. This condition as a neutral country rarely attracted an important volume of foreign investment, with some exceptions, as in the case of SOFINA, the multinational firm headquartered in Brussels. In short, the first half of the twentieth century was characterized by very low FDI levels, continuing the same structural profile that FDI had during the late nineteenth century.
The first wave of inward FDI starts during the golden age of Portuguese economic growth (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) (1964) (1965) (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) , when rates of per capita GDP growth attained levels never again reached in the economic history of Portugal (Amaral 2010). It was the first time FDI attained some expression, emphasizing the novelty of the period (see Figure 1) . The sharp increase in foreign investment started in 1960, with a stagnation in the late 1960s, but another surge after 1971. This breakthrough in the evolution of FDI justifies its historical singularity. In fact, 1943 1946 1949 1952 1955 1958 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 Nevertheless, sharp volatility characterizes these capital movements, emphasizing the small number of players involved. In addition, there is a strong concentration of outward FDI in only a few markets characterized by geographical proximity (Spain), cultural proximity (Brazil, Angola), and new Eastern markets (Poland). These locational characteristics stress the limited ownership-advantages Portuguese firms have, as emphasized by Castro (2004) .
The model of an investment development path (IDP) was introduced by Dunning as a dynamic approach to the OLI paradigm and is an interesting attempt to merge the evolution of inward and outward FDI into a single analytical framework. The country's level of development (by GDP per capita) interacts in a dynamic and recursive relationship with its international investment position (outward FDI stocks minus inward FDI stocks per capita).
The country economic development affects the conditions facing both domestic and foreign firms, influencing the flows and characteristics of inward and outward FDI. The flows and patterns of inward and outward FDI influence the country's economy, closing the recursive interaction (Dunning and Narula 1996) .
The first attempt to apply the IDP framework to Portugal was in a paper by Buckley and Castro (1998) 4 (see also Fonseca et al. 2007 ).
International comparisons suggest that Portugal is now a stage 4 country (Duran and Ubeda 2001), but its position in the international production network seems not to be fully established, according to Castro (2004) . The growth of outward FDI in the late 1990s matched a significant decline of inward FDI, which became more local-market oriented than before. In the previous boom periods of inward FDI, export-oriented manufacturing subsidiaries of multinational enterprises accounted for a substantial part of new investments in Portugal. This suggests that export-oriented FDI was the most affected for the current decline and supports the idea that it results from the declining competitiveness of Portugal as a location for FDI.
Multinationals are choosing other locations for manufacturing activities, explaining why employment in foreign subsidiaries is the lowest for OECD countries, with the exception of Japan. In the same vein "Portugal's transnationality index (UNCTAD) is only slightly above half that of Greece or Spain, and about one quarter that of Ireland" (Castro 2004 ).
Multinational enterprises escape the productivity gap revealed by the Portuguese economy by locating their export-oriented investment in other countries. 1970s. It will also be important to understand the entry strategies followed by foreign firms during the periods when a structural transformation took place in the volume of FDI inflows (1960s-1970s, late 1980s, and late 1990s) . Especially interesting must be the situation in the former period, when the influx of FDI coexisted with some protection. Finally, the reasons for the surge in outward FDI following the late 1990s remain largely unexplored.
Questions of interpretation

Autarchic phase and hostility to FDI during the 1930s and 1940s
Almost every work on inward FDI in Portugal has a short synthesis on its evolution during the twentieth century, namely during the Estado Novo. Expressions like "autarchic economic policy" and "prejudice against foreign investors" are used to characterize the Estado Novo until the mid-1960s (Simões 1985 (Simões , 1993 Leite et al. 2001 ).
However, more than a deliberate economic policy aimed at pushing away foreign investors, In addition, there are other reasons explaining why Portugal had witnessed low structural levels of FDI before the 1960s. The first is the deficiency of natural resources at a time when FDI was motivated by supply-oriented investment and not so much by a market-oriented investment. Geographical and cultural proximity is one of the reasons for foreign investments.
Being the Southwestern-most peripheral country in Europe and having as neighbour a country with a similar pattern of economic specialization helped to accentuate the low structural levels of FDI.
Nevertheless, the Capital Nationalization Law (Lei da Nacionalização dos Capitais, 1943) is
routinely invoked in the literature as an illustration of this autarchic phase, as it constitutes the first specific legal framework for FDI in Portugal. It reserved to domestic firms investment in several sectors: public services and utilities; sectors subject to exclusive concession by the state; defence industries; and "strategic sectors" to be defined in future legislation. This law was a threat to foreign interests in certain areas of the Portuguese economy in which foreign investment was higher, such as transport and communications, public utilities, and agricultural concessions in the colonies. Still, no deadlines were established for the transfer of foreign control to domestic, and the results were very slight, especially when compared to what was expected given the wording of the law. Some foreign companies in the colonies were nationalized (Companhia de Moçambique and Companhia do Porto da Beira), but this law was never used as a legal device to take over foreign firms acting in urban and railway transport, power or communications, for instance. Moreover, "the regime never used the most severe mechanism against foreign capital, the prohibition to repatriate profits." Therefore, the Capital Nationalization Law seems more a legislative act that must be understood within the context of a war economy and a vague programme of importsubstitution than a strategy to attack foreign economic interests operating in Portugal. This programme of import-substitution is in line with other measures seeking to overcome the disarticulation between the provisioning circuits in the world economy and the deviation by the belligerent countries of productive capacity to the war effort.
To sum up, the second quarter of the twentieth century with the sequence of economic crisis and war explains the collapse of capital flows in the international economy, as well as the attempt to preserve the domestic market for national entrepreneurs through the development of nationalistic economic policies. This was a common tendency and not so much a refusal in principle of FDI. When conditions changed and capital flows reanimated after the war, the country was also affected by this new favourable trend -even before any legal change.
What was the real importance of FDI in the golden age of economic growth?
This is one of the most important questions for understanding this critical period in Portuguese economic growth, but is also one of the most intractable. Alfredo de Sousa (Sousa 1969) estimated that 30% of private investment in Portugal was financed through foreign sources and Simões Lopes states a similar conclusion (Lopes 1996) . Other approaches to the importance of foreign firms in the Portuguese economy of the 1960s and early 1970s stated that FDI was responsible for 37% of exports (Fernandes 1992) . In addition, the importance of 
Entry strategies for foreign firms in the 1960s and early 1970s
FDI may cluster in some specific industries and the study of this issue becomes particularly interesting to understand the profile of foreign investment during this period of economic growth. Even more important is the analysis of the business strategies followed by foreign firms to enter into the Portuguese market (Barbosa and Louri 2002 from an econometric perspective). Table 1 shows the significance of FDI in different industries and the following paragraphs address the most important conclusions resulting from an analytical framework that may be applied to other periods of time. Matos, 1973; IIE, 1978 (own calculations) Table 2 summarizes the available evidence and proposes a taxonomy of the entry strategies used by MNCs in several industries (Jones 1996) . The first possibility concerns the advanced technological sectors, with strong ownership advantages, derived from research, branding, or organizational capabilities. In this case, a wholly-owned firm is established, usually through greenfield investment. This solution is found in the electronics and telecommunications The presence of banks in the equity of some of these advanced-technology firms in chemicals and electrical engineering may explain the position taken by Maria Belmira Martins (1976, 59 ), but without further confirmation, who claims that in the 1960s the volume of FDI was lower than the volume of firm creation by foreigners, considering the resort to the domestic capital market. The resort to domestic sources of capital was justifiable, considering the very low level of the real interest rate in Portugal throughout the period (Amaral 2002). In the consumer goods sector, there is an joint-venture between Unilever and a Portuguese retail distribution firm, Jerónimo Martins. This joint-venture created FIMA (margarine and oil), IGLO (ice-creams), and LEVER Portuguesa (personal, household, and laundry products).
In some traditional industries, in which the presence of domestic business groups was important, joint-ventures with local manufacturing firms were also common. Buckley and Casson (2010) . Political risk and a constricted institutional environment (even when free foreign capital entry was formally instituted after the mid-1960s) may be an important driver to promote joint-ventures between foreign multinationals and local firms.
Reasons for the rise of outward FDI after the late 1990s
The industry distribution of outward FDI is difficult to assess. -the second, starting with the massive privatizations program and liberalization policy followed after the late 1980s. The new business groups after the 1990s (Sonae, Jerónimo Martins, Amorim, Espírito Santo, Mello, and Mota-Engil) become more active in the international markets, moving from domestic-centric to multinational groups, in contrast with the first wave of business groups nationalized in 1975. Their turnover abroad already represents the largest share of the group's operations. For instance, the Sonae group, in shopping mall construction and management or laminated wood manufacturing has the largest part of these activities developed abroad. In the case of the production of laminated wood (the original manufacturing activity of the group and where it is a world leader) it has 21 plants across three continents. The Amorim group is present in different business segments, but it originated in cork manufacturing. It is today the world's largest producer of cork products and its manufacturing company is one of the most internationalized Portuguese firms. Business groups based on construction but having a trend to unrelated diversification (Mota-Engil) also have the largest share of their business activities outside Portugal. Therefore, second wave business groups turned to a multinational strategy after the late twentieth century as a way to escape the constraints of the small domestic market and also to increase competitiveness. In fact, internationalization acts in a recursive relationship with the accumulation of competitive resources and capabilities. They are needed to compete abroad and, simultaneously, being exposed to foreign competition strengthens their competitiveness. This contrasts with the domestic orientation of pre-1975 business groups.
Finally, and as was mentioned above, these investments abroad were geographically (Spain) and culturally (Brazil, Angola) close. This also testifies to the limited ownership advantages by many Portuguese firms (exceptions are some of the groups mentioned above).
